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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
M U R R A Y FIRST THRIFT AND 
LOAN COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DWAYNE STEVENSON and CARO-
LYN STEVENSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case arises from an action by Plaintiff-Respon-
dent for declaratory judgment that certain recorded as-
signments of contract by a non-party contract buyer are 
valid security interests in the Defendants,-Appellants, 
real property. 
Appellants deny any right or interest in the Re-
spondent and Counterclaimed to clear the unlawful clouds 
against their title to the real property and recover the 
damages occasioned thereby. 
Case No. 
13820 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was decided by the Honorable G. Hal Tay-
lor, without any material issues of fact, upon cross Mo-
tions by both parties for Summary Judgment supported 
by their Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The 
trial court granted Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and held, as a matter of law and equitable 
relief, that the recorded Assignments of Contract were 
enforceable against the Appellants who were thereby 
adjudged liable to the Respondeat for the sum of $7,188.77. 
Defendants take exception and appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek a reversal of the Summary Judg-
ment of the trial court and remand for a trial upon dam-
ages sustained by the Defendants as a result of the Plain-
tiff's willful and unlawful clouds on Defendants' real 
property. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
There was no conflict in the facts. 
Sometime in August, 1967, Mr. and Mrs. Steven-
son's employment compelled them to leave Utah and 
they began negotiations to sell their home to Jerry 
W. Cooper and Candy Cooper. The Stevensons and 
Coopers discussed their respective demands and require-
ments and eventually reached compatible terms of sale. 
A standard form Uniform Real Estate Contract was pr-
pared by Mr. Stevenson and executed by the Stevensons 
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and Mr. and Mrs. Cooper on the 29th day of August, 
1967. Paragraph 3 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
included a typewritten clause that: 
" . . . The Buyers agree that they cannot 
assign, sell or transfer their interest in this Con-
tract without specific written permission of the 
Sellers " 
The Coopers began to experience financial diffi-
culties and Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson permitted them 
a number of payment extensions in an effort to be of 
assistance. While the Coopers were thus some $800.00 
delinquent in their contract payments, they apparently 
contacted the Respondent Murray First Thrift and Loan 
Company requesting a personal loan in the sum of $6,-
610.90 for a purpose unknown. The Coopers and Murray 
First Thrift and Loan Company decided between them-
selves that they would execute and accept a form "As-
signment of Uniform Real Estate Contract" to secure 
their Agreement. Despite the clear and unequivocal re-
striction against assignments, neither the opportunistic 
Coopers nor Murray First Thrift and Loan Company 
ever contacted Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson. 
On the 5th day of February, 1974, Murray First 
Thrift and Loan Company recorded its first "Assignment 
of Uniform Real Estate Contract" with the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder against the Appellants' fee 
title. Still, there was no notice to, or written permission 
from, the unknowing Appellants. 
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It appears that in September, 1973, the Coopers and 
Murray First Thrift and Loan Company either recon-
structed their first arrangement or negotiated a second 
loan for the sum of $7,188.77. Again both the Coopers 
and Murray First Thrift and Loan Company totally ig-
nored Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson and on the 28th day of 
September, 1973, the second "Assignment of Uniform 
Real Estate Contract" was recorded by the Respondent 
against the Appellant's residence. 
Jerry W. Cooper filed his Petition in Bankruptcy 
with the United States Bankruptcy Court on the 20th 
day of November, 1973 and listed both the Appellants 
and Respondent as creditors. At the First Meeting of 
Creditors held on December 11, 1973, Mr. Stevenson was 
informed, for the first time, of the Coopers-Murray First 
Thrift and Loan Company's credit arrangements and the 
unpermitted, recorded "Assignments" against their real 
property. The next day Mr. and Mrs. Stevenson formally 
demanded that Murray First Thrift and Loan Company 
remove the wrongful "Assignments" and clear the title 
to their property. See, Defendants' Exhibit "2". Murray 
First Thrift and Loan Company refused to comply with 
the demands and initiated this action against Mr. and 
Mrs. Steveson claiming a right to perfect an interest by 
virtue of the "Assignments". 
The Appellants were never notified of the transac-
tions affecting their fee title by either the insolvent 
Coopers or the Assignee-Respondent and they have never 
given their written permission, consent or assent to any 
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assignments of the August 29, 1967 Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
These facts are established by the record submitted 
on appeal as set forth in the Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities filed by both parties in support of their 
respective Motions for Summary Judgment; and, by the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
and, by the trial court's Judgment and the Statement of 
Proceedings. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FIND-
ING THE E X P R E S S P R O H I B I T I O N 
AGAINST ASSIGNMENT OF THE STEVEN-
SON-COOPER UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
C O N T R A C T AN ENFORCEABLE CON-
TRACTURAL CONDITION PRECEDENT 
TO AN ASSIGNMENT FROM COOPERS TO 
RESPONDENT WHICH WOULD BE EFFEC-
TIVE AGAINST THE APPELLANTS. 
Contracts are generally assignable to third parties 
unless the original obligor and obligee expressly agree to 
restrict assignments as part of their contractural con-
sideration. § 70A-2-210 (2) (3) Utah Code Annotated. 
Specifically, there are two types of porohibitions 
against assignment of contracts: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(1) General Restrictions, which declare the agree-
ment nonassignable without any exception or recourse. 
55 Am. Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 432, Page 842; or, 
(2) Restrictions requiring the permission of the 
seller before assignment, which is the type involved in 
the Stevenson-Cooper Contract and is a condition prece-
dent that the Seller's written permission must be ob-
tained before a valid assignment by the Buyer. 55 Am. 
Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 435; Lockerby v. Amon, 
64 Wash. 24, 116 P. 463 (1911); Smith v. Martin, 94 Or. 
132, 185 P. 236 (1919); Goddard, Non-Assignment Pro-
visions in Land Contracts, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1932). 
An express condition precedent to assignment is for 
the sole benefit and protection of the obligor-seller who 
thereby reserves a right to contract only with the original 
obligee-buyer. Restatement of Contracts, 2d § 149 (2) 
Assignment of Rights, Comment (a). Concurrently, where 
the obligee-assignor contracts in assignment without the 
obligor's required written consent, the assignee can only 
acquire rights against the obligee-assignor. Fox-Green-
wald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros., 452 F. 2d 1346, 
1351 (1971); Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 P. 
2d 405 (1942). 
In the present case the express term of agreement 
between the Stevensons and Coopers restricting cootrtac-
tual assignment without prior written permission may 
not invalidate the subsequent, unpermitted contracts of 
assignment as between Coopers and the Respondent. 
However, the overwhektiing weight of authority holds 
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the Respondent cannot acquire any right or claims against 
either the Appellants or their fee title to the real prop-
erty. 
Professor Williston's treatise on the Law of Contracts 
states the rule in point as follows: "In an agreement to 
convey real estate it is not unusual to provide that the 
vendee shall not assign his right to conveyance and the 
provision is usually upheld; so, likewise, of a provision 
in a contract to sell goods that the buyer shall not assign 
his right" Williston on Contracts, § 422. Corbin on Con-
tracts § 873 at 491. 
The rule that restrictions of non-assignahility are 
for the exclusive benefit of the obligor has been adopted 
by the United States Supreme Court in Portuguese-
American Bank v. Welles, 242 U. S. 7, 37 S. Ot. 3, 61 L. 
Ed. 116 (1918) and the United States Court of Appeals 
in Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz Bros., 
452 F. 2d 1346 (1971) where it was stated: 
"Judicial holdings sustain overwhelmingly 
the proposition that a contractual ban on assign-
ment ordinarily serves to protect the obligor 
alone, and in no way imperils the transactions 
as between assignor and assignee . . . The obligor, 
of course, may gain from a valid and unwaived 
nonassignability provision the prerogative to re-
sist or even nullify the assignment . . ." 452 F. 
2d at 135. (Emphasis added.) 
See also, Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal. 2d 63, 130 
P. 2d 405, 408 (1942). 
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In the case of Smith v. Martin, 94 Or. 132, 185 P. 
236 (1919), the Plaintiff Smith agreed to sell his real 
property to G. D. Eatinger by a contract rontaining a 
condition precedent to assignment that " . . . he [Eatinger] 
will not assign or transfer this Contract, nor deliver the 
possession of said premises to any person or persons 
whomsoever without the consent in writing of the said 
first party [Smith]," Eatinger took possession of the real 
property and promptly attempted to assign his interests 
to the Peninsula Security Company which, in turn, en-
tered into a lease arrangement with the Defendant, Mar-
tin. Martin's arguments and briefs were submitted by 
the Peninsula Security Company which curiously alleged 
that it had no knowledge of the condition to assignment. 
The Supreme Court of Washington addressed itself to 
the law regarding non-assignment conditions in real prop-
erty lease and/or sales contracts and held that: 
"A 'contract' may be defined to be an agree-
ment between two or more parties competent 
to contract, upon a sufficient consideration, to 
do or not to do a particular thing which lawfully 
may be done or omitted. Hence the parties could 
provide that the contract should not be as-
signed without the written consent of one of 
them. There was nothing unlawful or contrary 
to public policy in such a stipulation, and under 
proper conditions the same may be enforced. 
. . ." " . . . in Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash. 400, 
97 Pac. 450, a lease contained covenants of the 
lessors to sell the land to the lessee in eight 
months at the latter's option, and also the coven-
ant of the lessee not to assign any part of the 
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lease. The Plaintiff had taken an assignment 
of the option without a written consent as re-
quired by the contract, and sued to compel spe-
cific performance. The court held that the coven-
ant against the assignment was lawful and that 
the purchaser without written consent acquired 
no rights. In another Washington case, Bonds-
Foster Lumber Co. v. Northern Pacific Railroad 
Co., 53 Wash. 302, 101 Pac. 877, it is laid down 
as a rule that — 
'One who accepts an assignment of a 
contract which by express terms is made 
nonassignable acquires only a cause of ac-
tion against the assignor.'" Smith v. Mar-
tin, 185 P. at 238 (citations omitted). 
The case of Lockerby v. Anton, 64 Wash. 24, 116 P. 
463 (1911), follows a series of cases decided by the Su-
preme Court of the State of Washington and is factually 
identical to the case now before this Court. There, Mr. 
and Mrs. Amon entered into a written contract with Mr. 
Swingle agreeing to sell their real property for $1,600.00 
with principal and interest payments to be paid within 
two years. The original sales contract also provided that: 
"It is further agreed that no assignment of this agreement 
shall be valid without the consent and signature of W. R. 
Amon and Sarah Amon . . .". Swingle assigned the con-
tract to a Mr. Johnson who then tendered the full per-
formance. The Amon's properly refused to recognize any 
right or interest in Johnson and the latter brought an 
action for specific performance which was pursued by 
Mr. Lockerby following Johnson's death. The trial court 
dismissed the action for specific performance and held 
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that the contract was non-assignable. Affirming the trial 
court's decision, the Washington Supreme Court stated: 
"It is not denied that stipulations of the 
character relied on in this case are lawful and 
binding upon the parties. There validity has 
been admitted by this court . . . (Citations 
omitted.) 
A vendor may have confidence that his 
vendee will not use the property to his disad-
vantage. It is his privilege to decline to deal 
with strangers. Or he may, by limiting the right 
of assignment, save any questions as to the in-
terest of intervening third parties, a result not 
all together unlikely under our community prop-
erty system. Or he may be unwilling to assume 
to pass upon the legal sufficiency of an assign-
ment. The better rule is stated in Omaha v. 
Standard Oil Company, 5 Neb. 337, 75 N. W. 859, 
wherein it is said: Tt compelled the city to deal 
with strangers, and to determine, at its peril, 
which of the contesting claimants was entitled 
to the fund. This may have been one of the very 
contingencies contemplated by the city, and 
against which it sought to provide by making 
the contract nonassignable. Another object in 
view might have been to prevent the company 
from losing interest in the performance of the 
contract by divesting itself of all beneficial in-
terest therein. But it is needless for us to specu-
late on the motives for the city's action. It is 
enough for us to know, whatever its reasons may 
have been, that it has in plain language stipulated 
against the assignment of the contract. That 
stipulation is valid and must be enforced. (Ci-
tation omitted,,) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
One who accepts an assignment of a contract 
which by express terms is made non-assignable 
acquires only a cause of action against the as-
signor.' See also Behrens v. Cloudy, 50 Wash. 
400, 97 P. 450. Whatever may have been the 
reasons for reserving the right to decline to deal 
with an assignee, such reservation contravenes no 
rule of public policy, and is enforceable. We at-
tach no importance to the clauses of the contract 
in which the word 'assignee' is used. They will be 
construed in light of the whole contract, and, 
when so regarded, must be taken to mean such 
assignees as the vendor is willing to accept." 101 
Pac. at 463-64. 
The recent Utah case of Blair Enterprise v. M-B 
Super Tire Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 192, 499 P. 2d 1294 
(1972), involved a written Real Estate Purchase Contract 
whereby Blair agreed to sell M-B real property located 
on Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The contract did 
not contain any conditions on assignment and Defendant 
M-B assigned its interest to Mr. Smith. The seller brought 
an action to declare the original contract unenforceable 
and the assignment of ". . . no force or effect." The 
District Court of Salt Lake County granted Summary 
Judgment to M-B Super Tire Market. On appeal this 
Court affirmed the trial court's decision and included 
the following guideline: 
"(1) There being no restrictions in the real 
estate purchase contract against its assignment, 
and the contract requiring the plaintiff to con-
vey to the defendant or its assigns, the assign-
ment was, and is, in all particulars valid, legal 
and enforceable as against the plaintiff." 92 
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C. J. S. Vendor and, Purchaser, § 311, p. 192, 
and cases cited. Blair Enterprises v. M-B Super 
Tire Market, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 193. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The assignments by the Coopers to the Respondent 
purports to convey all of the Cooper's "right, title and 
interest" in the Uniform Real Estate Contract. However, 
all of the "right, title and interest" in the contract is sub-
ject to a valid and express condition precedent which 
by overwhelming authority prohibits any assignment with-
out the Appellant's written permission. The Stevenson's 
permission was admittedly neither sought nor obtained 
by the parties to the assignment and, therefore, no "right, 
title or interest" in the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
or real property was conveyed by the Coopers to the Re-
spondent. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FIND-
ING THAT THE CLAUSE RESTRICTING 
ASSIGNMENT OF THE S T E V E N S O N -
COOPER CONTRACT WITHOUT THE SELL-
ER'S WRITTEN PERMISSION WAS A CON-
DITION PRECEDENT TO VALID ASSIGN-
MENT; AND, THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
C O M P L A I N T THEREFORE FAILS TO 
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
THE APPELLANTS. 
It is established that the Stevenson-Cooper Uniform 
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Real Estate Contract gave the Buyer a right to acquire 
fee title pursuant to the terms and conditions of the 
agreement 
The terms of sale including the price, method of pay-
ment and interest are consideration for the contract and 
are rights reserved for the benefit of the Appellants. A fur-
ther term of the agreement expressly restricts assign-
ment without the Appellant's written permission and is 
also consideration for the contract established for the 
benefit of the Appellants. Finally, the terms of the agree-
ment regarding breach and default by the Buyer are 
consideration for the contract reserved for the benefit 
of the Appellants. 
It is an accepted rule of law that "in the case of a 
contract for the sale of land, which gives the Buyer an 
immediate equitable property right, the equitable right 
cannot be more extensive than is fixed by the Contract 
that created it." Williston on Contracts, § 422 at 130. 
The assignments and nonpayments placed the Coopers 
in breach of contract. The Respondent, with con-
structive notice of the breach by assignment, can not 
benefit, much less receive, an interest in a contract which 
it knowingly violated. Respondent's subsequent recording 
of the wrongful assignments constitutes an unlawful cloud 
which the Appellants are entitled to have removed and 
then proceed to recover any damages occasioned thereby. 
The claims or remedies of the Respondent, if any, 
are limited solely to an action against the Coopers on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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their Promissory Note and/or the terms of the Cooper-
Murray First Thrift and Loan assignments. 
Therefore, Murray First Thrift and Loan Company 
has no cause of action against the Appellants and, the 
Appellants' Counterclaim for an unlawful cloud is proper. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING THE RESPONDENT EQUITABLE RE-
LIEF WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN OR-
DER OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE COOPER-MURRAY FIRST THRIFT 
AND LOAN ASSIGNMENTS. 
The case of Thein v. Silver Investment Company, 
87 Cal. App. 2d 306, 1% P. 2d 956 (1948), presents a 
situation similar to the case at issue. There, the Defen-
dant, Silver Investment Company, contracted to sell its 
real property to a Mr. Artz with the express condition 
precedent that " . . . no assignment of this contract shall 
be valid without the written consent of the sellers." Artz 
attempted to assign his interests to the Plaintiff, Thein, 
who ultimately brought an action against the original 
obligor, Silver Investment Company for specific perform-
ance of the land sales contract. Silver Investment Com-
pany, counterclaimed to quiet title and recover damages 
for its lost rentals. 
The California. Appellate Court affirmed the Super-
ior Court's denial of Thein's action for specific perform-
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ance; quieted title in the Defendant with an award of 
damages and, in determining that the Seller had complied 
with all aspects of the contract stated: 
". . . The contentions that equity abhors 
forfeitures and will grant relief, where possible, 
from a forfeiture, need not be considered at 
length. Equity does not aid one who is the sole 
cause of his own misfortune. Any forfeiture that 
here resulted was caused by appellant's [Thein] 
own acts. Under such circumstances, no princi-
pal of equity suggests, far less compels, the grant-
ing of relief to appellant. He has brought his mis-
fortunes upon his own head. (Emphasis added.) 
190 P. 2d at 962. 
In the instant situation, any loss to the Respondent 
results from its own willful acts in entering into an as-
signment of a Uniform Real Estate Contract which clear-
ly, upon its face, prohibited assignment without the Ap-
pellants' written permission. Such a self-inflicted injury 
is insufficient cause to invoke the equitable powers of a 
Court to grant specific performance; especially, in light 
of the considerable damage and expense that the Respon-
dent's conduct has visited upon the innocent Appellants 
who had, as consideration for the original contract, sought 
to protect themselves against just such injury arising 
from an unfortuitous assignment. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS A "SECUR-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ITY INTEREST" IN THE APELLANTS' 
REAL PROPERTY. 
The trial court improperly held that by virtue of the 
prohibited assignments, Murray First Thrift and Loan 
Company acquired! a "security interest" in the Steven-
son's real property which has both the operation and 
effect of making the Stevensons debtors of Murray First 
Thrift and Loan Company with an interest in the Steven-
sons' real property. 
Generally, a real property "security interest" is es-
tablished either by mortgage or deed of trust which must 
be executed by the party to be charged. § 76-1-14, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended). A valid security 
interest in personal property also requires that the in-
tended debtor execute a valid "Security Agreement", and 
there can be no attachment or perfection of any "security 
interest" until there is: (a) a signed agreement, and 
(b) value is given to the debtor by the secured party, and 
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. §§ 7GA-9-203, 
204(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended). 
In the case now before this Court there is absolutely 
no document executed by the Appellants or recorded 
either as a mortgage or deed of trust in favor of the Re-
spondent. There is no signed Security Agreement be-
tween Appellants and Respondent. There has been abso-
lutely no value given by Respondent to the Appellants 
and there is no privity of contract between the parties. 
Therefore, the Respondent cannot acquire a valid "secur-
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ity interest", claim or right, either by statute or at com-
mon law in the Appellant's real property and the deci-
sion of the trial court must be interpreted as creating a 
secured debt in the Appellants' real property without any 
consideration being given or received. 
POINT V. 
SIGNIFICANT CONSIDERATIONS OF PUB-
LICE POLICY REQUIRE THIS COURT TO 
REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT AND UPHOLD THE SANCTITY 
AND INTEGRITY OF CONTRACTS. 
It is for the good of the public that the law jealously 
defends the integrity of contracts and thereby insures 
to the people that when they find mutual assent and an 
exchange of valuable consideration in an arm's length 
transaction the lawful terms that they bargained for will 
be performed or, that a remedy for failure to perform 
the terms will be afforded by recourse to a court of law. 
The decision of the trial court in this case must be 
reversed in order to preserve the ability to reach a mean-
ingful contract. In the Stevenson-Cooper contract, the 
original parties had found mutual assent and exchanged 
valuable consideration in binding themselves to a reason-
able and enforceable agreement. Part of the considera-
tion which finally compelled the Appellants to enter into 
the contract was in the form of an express condition 
against assignment without their written permission. But 
for the Cooper's agreement to abide by the non-assigna-
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bility condition the Appellants would not have entered 
into the contract. The effect of the trial court's decision 
is to deny this valuable consideration and encourage the 
breach of other contracts similarly negotiated. 
The value of this condition precedent is further illum-
inated by the fact that it was demanded in order to pro-
tect the Appellanits from the expenses and troubles of 
litigation and unlawful clouds against their title which 
might result from an assignment of the contract against 
their better interests. The wisdom on their intent is now 
apparent. Had the Coopers, then seriously in default of 
payments, sought the required permission to assign the 
contract as security for Respondent's Promissory Note, 
the permission would, reasonably enough, have been de-
nied. The resulting cloud on the Appellants' title and 
expense of these proceedings would have been avoided. 
The trial court's decision frustrates the clear intentions 
of the original contracting parties and should be reversed. 
The Appellants have gained absolutely nothing by 
the improper Cooper-Murray First Thrift and Loan Com-
pany Assignments. The decision of the trial court will 
encourage further insubstantial credit arrangements and 
has the affect of creating a $7,188.77 debt against the 
Appellants where there has been no consideration or 
privity of contract whatsoever. 
The decision of the trial court, beyond interfering 
with the integrity of contract, may act to rescind all 
of the existing Uniform Real Estate Contracts in the 
State of Utah which contain restrictions against assign-
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ability. The ruling therefore encourages, if not insures, 
extensive and unnecessary litigation as well as injury 
to other innocent parties. 
CONCLUSION 
By ignoring the express restriction against assign-
ment of contract as a valid condition precedent to an 
enforceable assignment of the contract between the 
Coopers and the Respondent, the trial court committed 
substantial and prejudicial error as a matter of law. 
The trial court further erred in ruling that the Re-
spondent had acquired a "Security Interest" in the Ap-
pellants' real property where there is no supportive docu-
ment or consideration. 
The trial court further erred in granting the Respon-
dent equitable relief which was clearly unwarranted by 
any review of the facts. 
Finally, considerations of public policy and the sanc-
tity of contracts require that the Judgment of the Dis-
trict Court be reversed and the case remanded for a trial 
to determine the amount of damages suffered by Ap-
pellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEVEN FLINT LOWE 
Attorney for 
Defendants-Counterclaimants 
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